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Abstract
A time series (t=921) of weekly survey data on vote intentions in the Netherlands for
the period 1978-1995 shows that the percentage of undecided voters follows a cyclical
pattern over the election calendar. The otherwise substantial percentage of undecided
voters decreases sharply in weeks leading up to an election and gradually increases
afterwards. This paper models the dynamics of this asymmetric electoral cycle using
articial neural networks, with the purpose of estimating when the undecided voters
start making up their minds. We nd that they begin to decide which party to vote
for nine weeks before a rst order national parliamentary election and one to four
weeks before a second order election, depending on the type of election (European
Parliament, Provincial States, City-councils). The eect of political campaigns and
the implications for political analysis are discussed.
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1 Introduction
For most people voting is not instantaneous. They typically do not have to wait until
election day to know which political party they tend to favor. The identication of these
people with one of the major parties is the long-term inuence on the vote which, under
`normal' circumstances, determines in large part the election outcome. However, next to
these early-deciders or precommitted partisans there often are many undecided voters, even
late in some election campaigns, and last-minute deciders. Dutch opinion polls suggest
that the size of this group of undecided voters is quite substantial in the Netherlands.
During periods when no elections are ahead up to 30% of the eligible adult electorate fails
to mention a party when asked which party they would vote for if elections were held that
day. This percentage declines precipitously to approximately 15% in weeks leading up
to an election. Hence election outcomes also are, at least in part, the result of relatively
sudden changes in the undecided voters' feelings about candidates and political parties
in the nal few weeks (or days or even hours) of an election campaign. As we will see,
the recurring changes in the percentage of undecided voters appear in a cyclical fashion,
driven by national parliamentary elections. The quantitative study of these electoral cycles
is a relatively new eld of investigation in political research (Burklin 1987). Most of the
attention from political scientists has been directed towards noncyclical phenomena and
many traditional theories of political participation would interpret the cycles as a deviation
from equilibrium or the `normal' circumstances. This paper is a straightforward test of
the theory of short electoral cycles formulated by several authors, recently by Stray and
Silver (1983), Reif (1984), and Van der Eijk (1987)
1
. It uses a time series of survey-based
vote intentions in the Netherlands and attempts to pinpoint the timing of vote decisions,
that is, it considers the issue of how long before an election undecided voters make up
their minds for which party to vote.
A variety of factors can be proposed to explain the process that moves the undecided
voters through the electoral cycle. One is the suggestive covariation between the phases
of the cycle and political party campaigning. During election campaigns political par-
ties attempt to mobilize voters by modern campaign technologies and by heavy use of
mass media. Campaign resources are poured into political advertising and media image
making, and political candidates and their campaign sta temporarily shape the media
1
The short-term electoral cycle examined here is obviously not to be confused with the cyclical pattern
of election periods - realigning, stable alignment, and dealigning - across long stretches of time in American
history (see, for example, Beck 1979). According to the periodicity principle of the partisan realigment
theory, past American politics has followed regular cycles of stability and change in voter preference for the
full sweep of electoral history (see Chubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980). Our data more closely resemble
the cyclical pattern in by-election results as described by Stray and Silver (1983, 49): \the support for the
government declining after a general election, being at its lowest in mid-term, and then increasing as the
next general election approaches" (See also Reif 1985, Van der Eijk 1987).
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agenda. This would be particularly true for Dutch national parliamentary elections, where
extensive media coverage is provided
2
and where mass media organizations often commis-
sion or report public opinion polls. The exposure of these polls and early projections may
aect the intention to vote either in a bandwagon or an underdog direction (see Kavanagh
1981, Marsh 1984). It therefore seems plausible to assume that exposure to media cov-
erage of elections, especially television coverage, would stimulate the intention to go and
vote, although, as Morgan and Shanahan (1992) and Weaver (1996) note, heavy media
emphasis on campaign strategy and maneuvering can also make some voters more cynical
and less likely to vote. Television, Morgan and Shanahan (1992) argue, may narcotize and
depolitize the viewing audience and thereby discourage participation.
Furthermore, mass media exposure to election campaigns are often hypothesized as
inuencing beliefs about the closeness of the election race, and some political observers
tend to believe that more competitive election races increase vote intention and voter
turnout (see Hofstetter 1973, Zimmer 1981, Cox and Munger 1989, and Aldrich 1993)
3
.
The premise is that in a close race with no apparent front-runner the election outcome is
less certain. This uncertainty generates more interest among the public over the outcome,
which in turn becomes a stimulus leading more of the public to participate by voting
than would be the case when the election is a landslide or perceived to be one-sided.
A close election also provides rational reasons for people to vote. In a close race, more
citizens may vote because they believe that each individual vote counts more and that
their participation has a greater chance of aecting the outcome
4
. Another explanation of
why closeness is related to turnout is that parties respond to closeness with greater eort
at mobilization and get-out-the-vote campaigns (Cox and Munger 1989). In close-fought
contests, an eective campaign can make the dierence between victory and defeat.
A somewhat related explanation is that political campaigns intensify voters' feelings
about politics which drives up their vote intention. In weeks leading up to an election
political competition and intraparty conict typically increase. Where current political
controversies are deeply felt by large numbers of people, vote intentions should rise above
preceding levels. Hence, pre-election periods are times in which party dierences as per-
2
In the Netherlands there are no political campaign commercials on television during general elections.
Instead, the parties are given free air time to present their program to the electorate in a series of political
broadcasts.
3
It should be noted that electoral studies have typically conrmed the closeness-turnout link hypothesis
but most microlevel studies have denied any link (see Nownes 1992). Hence it may be that the hypothesis
suers an aggregation bias (Matsusaka 1993).
4
Obviously even in close-fought mass elections the instrumental value of voting is trivial because the
probability of a single vote being pivotal is negligible - the `paradox of not voting' (Ferejohn and Fiorina
1974). This is not to suggest that self-interest maximizing individuals will not participate in national
elections because there is an innitesimal probability that they could end up in a position to cast the
decisive vote. For many the costs of voting are small and there may be (albeit low) benets involved in
not abstaining (see Aldrich 1993).
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ceived by the electorate appear to be sharpest and, thus, the best guide to make a decision.
There are therefore compelling reasons for giving the correspondence between political
campaigning and the electoral cycle a causal interpretation. The mobilization eorts of
parties during election campaigns do not necessarily result in long-term allegiances how-
ever. Many people vote, if at all, for the candidate, not the party, and having done so,
abdicate partisan preferences. Moreover, the recurring increases in the number of unde-
cided voters during post-election periods may be a response to the perceived gap between
campaign promises and incumbent government performance. Unrealistically high initial
expectations about what parties or the government will accomplish give way to disappoint-
ment at some time after the election (Stimson 1976, Sigelman and Knight 1985). Moreover,
while the intention to vote for the parties who have won the election typically increases
shortly after the election itself, presenting a `halo' eect or a `post electoral euphoria' that
may even drive their popularity above the value expressed at the election result, voters for
losing parties may temporarily be depressed and demobilized (Reif 1984, 1985). This may
result in a loss of interest in politics, resignation and, in subsequent elections, nonvoting.
Of course, this two-way switching of mobilization of winners and withdrawal by losers may
cancel at the aggregate level of vote intention.
Although these explanations for the cyclical dynamics of vote intention pertain to all
general elections, they are particularly relevant to what Reif and Schmitt (1980) call rst
order elections, i.e., those which allocate the most powerful and important political oces
in a country. In the Netherlands, as in all parliamentary systems, these are the elections
for the National Parliament. They constitute the most competitive contest because there
is much at stake. Elections which are held in between the national parliamentary elections
are the less-competitive second order elections. In the Netherlands these are the elections
for the European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils. In these less-at-stake
elections abstaining is generally perceived to have less serious consequences.
This paper examines the inuence of rst and second order elections on the percentage
of undecided voters. The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
and species our research questions. The data show complicated dynamic patterns which
hint towards potential nonlinear structure. We consider the use of articial neural networks
[ANNs], which is also motivated by the specic nature of our research questions. Section 3
briey outlines some key features of ANNs. In contrast to much empirical research in this
area, we do not treat this model as a `black box' but, on the contrary, we explicitly use it
components for inference. Section 4 presents our empirical results for the weekly series of
undecided voters and Section 5 provides interpretations of our ndings and implications
for political analysis.
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2 The data and the research questions
The data we use are taken from the NIPO Inc.'s Omnibus survey, a weekly survey based
on personal interviews of a random cross-section sample of the Dutch population of age 18
and over. The number of respondents to the surveys equals just over 1,000 on average. A
detailed description of the NIPO surveys is given in Eisinga and Felling (1992). The data
we use are the responses to the question, asked in the same form in every survey, \Which
party would you vote for if elections were held today?" taken over weekly intervals from the
rst week of 1978 to the last week of 1995, giving 921 observations in total. The measure
we employ is the number of `undecided voters', that is, the percentage not supporting a
particular party as a proportion of the total number of responses to the vote intention
question. Of the (18x52=) 936 potential surveys the following ones are missing (last two
digits of year followed by week number): 78.52, 79.01, 79.40, 79.52, 80.01, 81.01, 82.52,
83.08, 83.31, 84.52, 85.52, 87.01, 89.52, 90.52, and 92.01. The series is graphed in Figure
1. Circles, cubes, triangles, and diamonds indicate elections for National and European
Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively. The exact election dates
from 1974 to 1995 are listed in Table 1.
- insert Figure 1 -
- insert Table 1 -
As indicated, the most striking feature of this time series is its typical cyclical pat-
tern. This cycle is closely connected to the dates of the rst order national parliamentary
elections: few weeks after each such election, the percentage of undecided voters starts
displaying an upward movement, which gradually levels o and changes into a downward
movement in weeks leading up to the next election. We dene these periods of upward
and downward movement as post-election and pre-election regimes, respectively, and one
post- and one pre-election regime together constitute an election cycle. This election cycle
is seen to be rather asymmetric, as the post-election regime in general lasts much longer
than the pre-election regime, notable exceptions being the cycles following the regularly
scheduled election held in May 1981 and the early election of September 1982 caused by
the untimely fall of the coalition government. As such asymmetry in general cannot be
modeled using linear time series models
5
, it seems likely that some nonlinear structure is
present in the data.
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This conjecture is based on the election cycle's similarity with the business cycle, where upward and
downward movements correspond to expansions and recessions, respectively. Asymmetry in the business
cycle has been documented extensively, see Ramsey and Rothman (1996) and Sichel (1993, 1994) for recent
discussions, and is generally modeled using nonlinear models.
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Second order elections (i.e., those for European Parliament, Provincial States, and
City-councils) seem to hamper the general cyclical pattern as they cause a temporary
decline, which is restored fairly quickly after the particular election has been held (and is
not followed immediately by another election). If we disregard the election cycle, there
seems to be a slight upward trend in the percentage of undecided voters, at least until
1994. This trend towards less party voting parallels the well-known and much-maligned
decline in electoral turnout rates in many Western industrial democracies in the past
few decades (e.g., Shaer 1981, Abramson and Aldrich 1982, Chen 1992, Flickinger and
Studlar 1992, Armingeon 1994, Fenster 1994, and Nardulli, Dalager, and Greco 1996). It
is fairly well accepted, although not always rigorously documented, that this decline is
generated, among others, by long-term factors such as a decline in the saliency of politics
for most citizens, a decline in the attachment of voters to parties and an increase in political
alienation, especially a rise in feelings of powerlessness or lack of ecacy, and apathy (see
Shaer 1981, Abramson and Aldrich 1982, Chen 1992, Aldrich 1993, Armingeon 1994, and
Southwell 1995). These changes may obviously be the result of the turnover of electoral
generations and of other structural changes such as a shifting age distribution. Moreover, as
can be seen in both Figure 1 and Table 1, the election calendar has frequently called Dutch
voters to the polls. The increased number of elections may have gradually devaluated the
importance of any single election and may have induced voter fatigue. From August
1992 until approximately June 1993, there is a slight decrease which cannot be ascribed
to a de facto election. This anomaly might be attributed to the fact that during this
period early elections were foreseen. At the time, the Dutch coalition cabinet faced great
internal disagreement over several policy reviews and many people anticipated the demise
of the coalition government and thus an early election. The major issue in the media, for
example, was not whether there would be an early election but when. The multiparty
coalition ultimately experienced no early termination however. It averted the crisis and
remained in oce for the complete term until the next regular scheduled election of May
1994.
In this paper, we formally investigate the inuence of rst and second order elections
on the percentage of undecided voters. More specically, we address the following three
questions.
1. How long before an election does the downward movement in the percentage of
undecided voters begin?
2. What is the size of the downward movement, i.e., how large is the decline in per-
centage points?
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3. Do rst and second order elections have similar eects on the decline in the percent-
age of undecided voters with respect to timing and magnitude?
We address these questions in the context of articial neural network [ANN] models. As
explanatory variables in our models we use lagged values of the percentage of undecided
voters, denoted y
t
, as well as the number of weeks until and after the various elections held
in the Netherlands. We denote the latter as t
u;j
and t
a;j
, respectively. The subscript j is
used to identify the type of election, j = NP;EP; PS, or CC corresponding to elections
for National and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively.
The variables t
u;j
and t
a;j
have been rescaled by dividing them by the maximum number of
weeks between two elections of the same type (which equals 260, for elections for European
Parliament are held once in every ve years) and subtracting this from 1. This transforma-
tion guarantees that the `until' and `after' variables are equal to one at the time of elections
of the corresponding type
6
, which facilitates interpretation of the NN-estimation results,
as will be discussed below. In the next section, we provide some background information
about ANN models.
3 Articial Neural Networks
Articial neural network models, or simply articial neural networks [ANNs], have been
adopted from cognitive science, and are inspired by the way information is thought to be
processed in the human brain. Although ANNs are `merely' nonlinear regression models,
perhaps because of their origin there is some mystique associated with them, which is
accentuated by the rather exotic names given to the various ingredients of ANNs, such as
input and output units, connection strengths, neurons, hidden layers, and activation func-
tions. We refer the interested reader to Ripley (1993, 1994, 1996) for general introductions
to ANN models. Here we restrict attention to one particular form of these models, called
the single layer feedforward neural network model, which takes the form,
y
t
= 
0
+
q
X
j=1

j
F (
0
j
z
t
) + "
t
; (1)
where y
t
; t = 1; : : : ; T is the output or dependent variable, z
t
is a vector of input or
explanatory variables, consisting of lagged endogenous and exogenous variables, i.e., in
our case z
t
= (1; ~z
t
)
0
, ~z
t
= (y
t 1
; : : : ; y
t p
; t
u;NP
; : : : ; t
a;CC
)
0
. The activation functions F ()
in the q so-called hidden units, 
j
F (), are taken to be logistic functions, i.e., F (w) =
1=(1 + exp( w)). Finally, the "
t
is assumed to be a white noise process.
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In order to adequately capture the fact that the trough of the election cycle is reached after the election
has been held, t
u;j
is set equal to 1 in the week immediately following an election of type j as well.
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The ANN model with one hidden layer as given in (1) is the most popular form in
applications to economic time series, see, e.g., Kuan and White (1994), Kuan and Liu
(1995), and Swanson and White (1995), among others. It is seen that such an ANN really
is nothing more than a regression model with a time-varying constant, where at each
point in time the value of the intercept is determined by the values taken by the hidden
units. However, if the number of hidden units, q, is taken suciently large, the single layer
feedforward ANN (1) provides a very exible modeling tool, which can accomodate a wide
variety of dynamic patterns in the variable of interest, y
t
.
In much empirical research, ANNs are treated as a `black box', with the researcher
having little knowledge, let alone control, of what is going on in the model or why particular
results are obtained. In contrast, we explicitly employ the structure of the ANN to obtain
interpretable results and draw empirical inference regarding the impact of the various
types of elections on the percentage of undecided voters. For that purpose, we impose
a particular structure on the so-called connection weights 
j
. First of all, we include
four hidden units into the model in which the 
j
's are restricted in such a way that
each of these units is governed only by a single `until' variable, that is, 
j
is such that
the argument of the activation function in the j-th hidden unit, 
0
j
z
t
, can be written as

0
j
z
t
= 
u;j
(t
u;j
 
u;j
), where j = NP;EP; PS;CC. In the sequel, we will use the shorthand
notation F
u;j
; j = NP;EP; PS;CC, to denote the resulting activation functions. We
impose the identifying restriction 
u;j
> 0, such that the function F
u;j
changes from zero
to one as t
u;j
becomes larger. Because of the transformation which is applied to the time
until elections of type j (see Section 2), the j-th hidden unit becomes active whenever
elections of type j approach (only if these elections have any impact on the percentage of
undecided voters of course). The parameter 
u;j
can be tentatively interpreted as the time
when the j-th unit becomes active, as F
u;j
= :5 when t
u;j
= 
u;j
.
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The other parameter in
F
u;j
, 
u;j
, indicates whether the transition from inactive to active is gradual (
u;j
small)
or fast (
u;j
large).
Concerning the time after elections, recall that the election cycle appears to be driven
by the time relative to elections for National Parliament. As will be evident from Figure 1,
the impact of the second order elections for European Parliament, Provincial States, and
City-councils is relatively small when compared to the eects of the rst order elections for
National Parliament. For this reason, we only allow the time after elections for National
Parliament, t
a;NP
, to enter the model. In a similar vein as discussed above, we include
this variable by adding another hidden unit which is controlled by t
a;NP
only, i.e., with
7
Note that this interpretation of 
u;j
as the starting point of the election eect is valid only if 
u;j
is
large, such that F
u;j
changes almost instantaneously from zero to one as t
u;j
becomes larger than 
u;j
. If

u;j
is small, the j-th hidden unit becomes active much earlier, as F
u;j
is already nonzero long before t
u;j
becomes equal to 
u;j
.
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0
j
z
t
= 
a;NP
(t
a;NP
  
a;NP
); 
a;NP
> 0. Finally, to accomodate temporal dependence in
our time series, we add four lagged values of the endogenous variable as well. Hence, our
basic model is given by,
y
t
= 
0
+
p
X
i=1

i
y
t i
+
CC
X
j=NP

u;j
F (
u;j
(t
u;j
 
u;j
))+
a;NP
F (
a;NP
(t
a;NP
 
a;NP
))+"
t
: (2)
The ANN (2) implicitly assumes that only the level of the series changes over time.
However, the dependence between consecutive observations might change as well. Com-
paring autocorrelations for subsamples consisting of observations shortly before election
dates and of other observations (not reported here) reveals that this indeed seems to be
the case. It is straightforward to extend the ANN (2) to allow for varying autoregressive
parameters as well, by augmenting the intercepts 
u;j
in the hidden units with linear com-
binations
P
p
i=1

i;j
y
t i
, for j = NP;EP; PS;CC. With four hidden units, the number of
parameters to be estimated would increase substantially. Moreover, the parameters 
i;j
are estimated using only a small number of observations, as the hidden units are expected
to become active only in the nal few weeks before elections, which are held only four
or ve times during the sample period. Therefore, we will assume that the coecients
corresponding to lagged y
t
's are aected in the same way by each type of election, and
that the eect of two elections which are close by is the same as that of isolated elections.
These restrictions can conveniently be incorporated by extending model (2) as follows,
y
t
= 
0
+
p
X
i=1

i
y
t i
+
4
X
i=1

i
y
t i
(1 
CC
j=NP
[1  F (
u;j
(t
u;j
  
u;j
))]) +
CC
X
j=NP

u;j
F (
u;j
(t
u;j
  
u;j
)) + 
a;NP
F (
a;NP
(t
a;NP
  
a;NP
)) + "
t
: (3)
To understand that the multiplicative term (1 
CC
j=NP
[1 F
u;j
]) in (3) serves our purpose,
note that it equals zero in times when no elections are close by as all F
u;j
are then equal to
zero. When an election of type j approaches, F
u;j
changes from zero to one, 1 F
u;j
does
the opposite, 
CC
j=NP
[1 F
u;j
] also switches from one to zero, such that the complete term
changes from zero to one. Also note that if two elections are that close that their individual
hidden units become active simultaneously the multiplicative term still equals one. In order
to distinguish model (3) from model (2), we will call the former a multiplicative neural
network [MNN]. In the next section we discuss and interpret estimates of the ANN and
MNN models (2) and (3) for our weekly time series of percentages of undecided voters.
4 Results
In this section we discuss estimates of the models (2) and (3) for the weekly observed
percentage of undecided voters in the Netherlands. We also estimate models with certain
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restrictions imposed to investigate similarities between dierent types of elections. To
choose between the dierent models, we use the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria
[AIC and SIC, respectively]. These criteria are computed as AIC = ln
2
"
+ 2k=T and
SIC = ln
2
"
+k ln(T )=T , where 
2
"
is the residual variance and k is the number of estimated
parameters in the model. Granger et al. (1995) advocate the use of such criteria for model
selection because in this approach no particular model is favored a priori . An obvious
drawback of this procedure is that all competing models have to be estimated, which
can become rather time-consuming if the number of relevant alternative models is large.
Throughout we include four lagged values of the dependent variable in the model, i.e., we
set p in (2) and (3) equal to 4. A dummy variableD
t
, which equals 1 in week 81.43 and zero
otherwise is also included. The outlier in this single week, which is clearly visible in Figure
1, is caused by a failure of the survey organization's error-control procedure resulting in
a one-of-a-kind overrepresentation of undecided voters composed largely of misclassied
early deciders.
In general, estimation of ANN models is hampered by the fact that the model is not
identied, and that the hidden units tend to be highly correlated. For that reason, quite
complicated and ambiguous estimation procedures have to be used to estimate ANNs. In
contrast, because of the structure we have imposed on the hidden units, our ANN models
in (2) and (3) are identied. Although we still expect the hidden units to be correlated
to some extent as elections of dierent types are often held quite close to each other, we
decide to estimate our models using nonlinear least squares.
4.1 Constant autoregressive parameters
First of all, we consider the ANN model (2) with constant autoregressive parameters. The
model is estimated as follows,
y
t
= 4:262
(1:566)
+ 9:603
(2:084)
D
t
+ 0:458
(0:033)
y
t 1
+ 0:178
(0:036)
y
t 2
+ 0:111
(0:036)
y
t 3
+ 0:113
(0:032)
y
t 4
  2:076
(0:376)
F
u;NP
  1:281
(0:475)
F
u;EP
  3:023
(1:165)
F
u;PS
  1:573
(0:448)
F
u;CC
  2:370
(12:67)
F
a;NP
+ "
t
; (4)
where standard errors are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
The impact of elections can be decomposed in `timing' and `magnitude', cf. questions
1 and 2, respectively, as posed in Section 2. Franses and Draisma (1997) suggest to
examine plots of the values taken by the hidden units over time to get some idea of the
contribution of the various nonlinear components to the overall model output. Here we
use this graphical device to assess the timing aspect of the inuence of the dierent types
of elections. The activation functions F
u;j
(multiplied by 10, in order to increase visibility)
in (4) have been graphed in Figure 2 for each type of election separately.
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- insert Figure 2 -
It is seen that the hidden unit corresponding to a particular type of election becomes
active only a short while before elections are held. The estimates of the constants 
u;j
give an indication of the length of this period. The estimates (standard errors in paren-
theses) are given as 
u;NP
= 0:966(0:032); 
u;EP
= 0:981(0:019); 
u;PS
= 0:996(0:001),
and 
u;CC
= 0:983(0:013). Translated back into number of weeks prior to election these
estimates become 9, 4, 1, and 4. That is, 9 weeks before elections for National Parliament
are held does the number of undecided voters start decreasing, etc., see also Table 2. The
unreported estimates of 
u;j
are very large, such that the value of the activation function
F
u;j
switches almost instantaneously from 0 to 1 as the number of weeks until elections of
type j becomes equal to the number of weeks implied by the estimates of 
u;j
.
- insert Table 2 -
The impact of elections in terms of the magnitude of the decrease in the percentage of
undecided voters can be assessed by computing the dierence between the expected value
of y
t
in (4) and the expected value of y
t
if the activation functions would not become active.
If elections of type j are held at time T and the corresponding hidden unit becomes active
s weeks before, the impact on the percentage of undecided voters in week T   s+ k; k =
0; 1; : : : ; s, denoted as I
j
(y
T s+k
); j = NP; : : : ; CC, is given by
I
j
(y
T s+k
) =
p
X
i=1

i
I
j
(y
T s+k i
) + 
u;j
F
u;j
; (5)
where I
j
(y
T s+l
) = 0 if l < 0. When computing the impact of elections for National
Parliament we should take into account the eect of the hidden unit corresponding to
the time after these elections, F
a;NP
. As the output of this unit is rather small shortly
before elections we neglect it for simplicity. Using the estimates in (4), the impact of the
elections for National and European Parliaments, Provincial States and City-councils in
the week the elections are being held, I
j
(y
T
), are estimated to be 8.81, 2.83, 3.02, and 3.59
percentage points in absolute value. Especially for the rst order national parliamentary
elections this seems to be a rather modest decrease, also because Figure 1 suggests that the
decline at the time of these elections seems much larger. However, it should be observed
that, except for 1981, other elections are held just before or just after the elections for
national parliament. Hence, the total decline is an accumulation of impacts of dierent
elections. This point is also illustrated in Figure 3. The middle panel of this Figure shows
the values of the activation functions for all elections simultaneously. This graph reveals
that, due to the proximity of dierent elections, the dierent hidden units are activated
almost immediately following each other. In fact, sometimes more than one hidden unit
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is active. In the lower panel of Figure 3, the hidden unit corresponding to the time after
elections for National Parliament is also shown. It is seen that the output of this unit
changes very slowly. Among others, this suggests that it takes quite a long time before
the percentage of undecided voters is back at its pre-election high level, which amounts to
clear evidence of asymmetry in the data.
- insert Figure 3 -
Similarities between dierent types of elections can be examined by testing restrictions
on the hidden units F
u;j
and/or the parameters 
u;j
. We estimate several special cases
of (2) and compare the values of the model selection criteria AIC and SIC. First of all,
it is of interest to examine whether the elections have any impact at all. This question
is adressed by estimating model (2) without the hidden units controlled by the time until
the various elections. In Table 3, the values for the model selection criteria are given in
the row 
u;NP
= 
u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
= 0. A second question of interest is whether
the timings of the election eects are signicantly dierent from each other. For that
purpose, model (2) is estimated with the restrictions 
u;NP
= 
u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
 
u
and 
u;NP
= 
u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
 
u
imposed. This renders an estimate of 
u
=
0:984 (and 
u
still very large) and AIC and SIC values as shown in Table 3, in the row
F
u;NP
= F
u;EP
= F
u;PS
= F
u;CC
 F
u
. Similarly, we test whether the second order
elections for European Parliament, Provincial States, and City-councils have any impact
(
u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
= 0), and if so, whether they dier from each other with respect
to timing (F
u;EP
= F
u;PS
= F
u;CC
 F
u
).
- insert Table 3 -
The values of the information criteria for the various variants of the ANN in Table 3
indicate that the AIC favors the unrestricted model (4), in which all elections are allowed to
have dierent eects. The model in which the timing of the eects of second-order elections
are equal is a close competitor, and is preferred by the SIC. Hence we conclude that the
hidden units contribute to explaining the movements in the percentage of undecided voters.
According to AIC, rst order and second order elections start to have an eect at dierent
times before an election is held, while there appears to be considerable similarity between
the dierent second order elections. According to SIC, second order elections might have
no eect at all, or the importance of the rst order elections might be questioned.
4.2 Time-varying autoregressive parameters
While the models discussed in the previous subsection appear to provide quite convincing
and intuitive results for the impact of elections on the number of undecided voters, they are
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restrictive in the sense that the autoregressive parameters are assumed to be constant over
time. The MNN model (3), which does not impose this restriction, is initially estimated
as follows,
y
t
= 4:316
(1:143)
+ 9:736
(2:061)
D
t
+ 0:402
(0:035)
y
t 1
+ 0:237
(0:038)
y
t 2
+ 0:115
(0:038)
y
t 3
+ 0:100
(0:034)
y
t 4
+
[ 0:467
(0:098)
y
t 1
  0:493
(0:119)
y
t 2
+ 0:094
(0:105)
y
t 3
+ 0:021
(0:096)
y
t 4
] [1 
CC
j=NP
(1  F
u;j
)]
  3:558
(1:137)
F
u;NP
  2:934
(1:272)
F
u;EP
  3:108
(1:473)
F
u;PS
  2:902
(1:038)
F
u;CC
  2:363
(9:348)
F
a;NP
+ "
t
: (6)
Although some of the estimates of the autoregressive parameters are not signicant,
we decide not to simplify this model, but instead focus again on the output of the hidden
units. The activation functions F
u;j
are examined to assess the impact of elections. Figure
4 shows the individual activation functions, again multiplied by 10, while in Figure 5
they are graphed for all elections simultaneously. The output is seen to correspond quite
closely with the results from model (2) (see also Table 2). The main dierence occurs
in the hidden unit corresponding to the elections for City-councils: the estimate of the
constant 
u;CC
is now equal to 
u;CC
= 0:989(0:076), which implies that activity of the
hidden unit is restricted to 2 weeks prior to elections. Again, the impact of elections
in terms of magnitude of decrease can be estimated by computing the dierence in the
expected value of y
t
due to the activity of the corresponding hidden unit. Note that the
impact now is computed as,
I
j
(y
T s+k
) =
p
X
i=1

i
I
j
(y
T s+k i
) + (
p
X
i=1

i
I
j
(y
T s+k i
) + 
u;j
)F
u;j
: (7)
Using the estimates in (6), the impact of elections for National and European Parliaments,
Provincial States, and City-councils in the week the elections are being held, I
j
(y
T
), are
estimated to be 18.92, 8.18, 3.11, and 5.45 percentage points in absolute value. These
estimates dier considerably from the impact estimates based on the ANN (4), and perhaps
appear to be somewhat more reasonable.
The same restrictions with respect to existence and timing of the eect of elections
as in the previous subsection have been examined by estimating dierent special cases of
the MNN (3). The values of the model selection criteria are given in the two rightmost
columns of Table 3. It appears that this time the AIC favors the model in which the timing
of second order election eects are identical, while the SIC prefers the model in which no
distinction is made between rst and second order elections.
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5 Conclusions and discussion
While our results may not be surprising, they do represent, to the best of our knowledge,
the rst quantitative estimates of short-term cycles in self-reported vote intention. The
ANNs models reported here demonstrate that rst and second order Dutch elections have
an unequal impact on the timing of vote decisions of undecided voters and on the change
of the size of this group in the nal few weeks before election. The estimates show that un-
decided Dutch voters begin to make up their minds nine weeks before a rst order national
parliamentary election and one (Provincial States) to four weeks (European Parliament
and City-councils) before a second order election. Whereas rst order national parliamen-
tary elections drive up the proportion of voters considerably, second order elections expand
this group by a few percentage points only.
At the outset of this paper, we reviewed several possible explanations for this cyclical
pattern in vote intention. They all lead to the suspicion that the electoral cycles reect
the impact of party campaigning. They are so closely t to the election dates that they
leave little room for additional explanation. Why else should vote intention behave in this
fashion and with such regularity? Hence while the analysis presented here does not directly
speak to this question, the results suggest that the electoral cycles are the time-related
eects of time-related campaigns.
Election campaigns have for a long time been thought to have limited eects on voters
because partisan precommitment of early deciders would be sucient to preclude campaign
eects and because the remainder of the voters, who are presumed to lack interest in
political news, would lack exposure to the campaign. Indeed, Chaee and Choe (1980) and
Whitney and Goldman (1985) show that precommitted voters or already-decided partisans
are also those least likely to be swayed by campaign messages. These people have already
decided on a candidate or party before the campaign gets underway and they attend media
reports only to reinforce existing preferences. However, the authors also nd that in the
absence of a precampaign decision, those exposed to the heavy ow of information during
the campaign decide primarily on the basis of this information (see also Caldeira, Clausen,
and Patterson, 1990, Bowen 1994, and Finkel and Schrott 1995). It is the undecided, those
who make their decision during the conduct of the campaign, who are most aected by the
campaign message. Obviously, if parties are to win, they must both mobilize their existing
support and reach out to those who have not yet decided. As the undecided voters are
often the key to a winning election, they are a major target for electoral campaigns. In the
Netherlands there is no legally recognized, ocial, or formal campaign period prior to the
election. Dutch election law only requires that the nomination of candidates be established
seven weeks before polling day. Election campaigns for the National Parliament generally
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include only the nal three or four weeks before the election, but in the `pre-campaign'
period parties have already nominated their candidates and leader, and presented their
election program to the electorate.
Huckfeld and Sprague (1992) show that active campaigns are more eective at getting
the votes out than moribund campaigns. This explains why in rst order national par-
liamentary elections undecided voters make up their minds earlier than in second order
elections and why there are many rst-order-election-only voters. The strategic eorts of
political parties and their leaders and the features of a particular campaign environment
aect the timing of participation and thus the aggregate rise and fall of participation within
and across electoral cycles. In more-at-stake rst order elections the amount and quality of
campaigning and partisan eorts, television time given to parties, and media coverage are
typically greater than in less-at-stake second order elections. The latter, particularly the
Euro elections, generally have very little appeal for party activists. One could therefore
also argue that campaign eorts are more important at second order elections than at rst
order elections. In the latter, there is generally much more attention given by the public
(media as well as voters), because the entire political life of the country is focused on this
event.
The results also suggest some implications for political analysis. Several election an-
alysts have shown that the percentage of survey respondents who say that they will vote
consistently outnumbers ocial turnout statistics. Similarly, respondents to post-election
surveys claim retrospectively higher turnout voting than actually occurred (see Anderson
and Silver 1986, Sigelman 1982, Hill and Hurley 1984, Swaddle and Heath 1989, Smeets
1995, and Marsh 1985). This study has made some progress on previous research by
showing that the point in time a particular survey is conducted substantially aects the
estimates of self-reported vote intention. Surveys administered in between elections may
even underestimate actual turnout, sometimes quite dramatically so. In the same vein,
comparative studies of survey-based turnout (longitudinal as well as cross-national) should
pay close attention to the timing of the surveys used in the comparison
8
. Last but by no
means least, this paper has shown that articial neural network models [ANNs] do not
necessarily have to be treated as a black box. They can explicitly be used for inference.
Needless to say that this depends in part on the research problem at hand.
8
Examples of cross-national comparative studies of voter turnout, either based on survey data or ocial
statistics, are Powell (1986), Pettersen (1989), Flickinger and Studlar (1992), Armingeon (1994), Hirczy
(1994), Jackman and Miller (1995), and Pacek and Radcli (1995).
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Table 1: Election dates in the Netherlands,
1974-1995
1
Type of Election
NP EP PS CC
05-25-77 03-27-74 05-29-74
05-26-81 03-29-78 05-31-78
09-08-82 06-07-79 03-24-82 02-06-82
05-21-86 06-14-84 03-18-87 03-19-86
09-06-89 06-15-89 03-06-91 03-21-90
05-03-94 06-09-94 03-08-95 03-02-94
1
Election dates (MM-DD-YY) in the Netherlands
in the period 1974-1995. NP = National Parliament,
EP = European Parliament, PS = Provincial States,
CC = City-council.
Table 2: Timing of vote decision
1
ANN MNN
Type of Election 
u;j
No. of weeks 
u;j
No. of weeks
NP 0.966 9 0.963 9
EP 0.981 4 0.981 4
PS 0.996 1 0.996 1
CC 0.983 4 0.989 2
1
Estimates of the constants in the activation functions in the ANN model (4)
and the MNNmodel (6). NP = National Parliament, EP = European Parliament,
PS = Provincial States, CC = City-council.
Table 3: Selection criteria for model variants
1
ANN MNN
Restriction AIC SIC AIC SIC
| 1:481 1:591 1:463 1:595

u;NP
= 
u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
= 0 1:543 1:590 1:543 1:590
F
u;NP
= F
u;EP
= F
u;PS
= F
u;CC
1:504 1:567 1:464 1:548

u;EP
= 
u;PS
= 
u;CC
= 0 1:505 1:568 1:495 1:580
F
u;EP
= F
u;PS
= F
u;CC
1:487 1:566 1:461 1:561
1
Model selection criteria for variants of ANN (4) and MNN (6). AIC = Akaike
Information Criterion, SIC = Schwarz Information Criterion. NP = National Parlia-
ment, EP = European Parliament, PS = Provincial States, CC = City-council. The
model with minimum values for AIC and SIC is preferred.
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Figure 1: Undecided voters in the Netherlands, 1978-1995
Note: Percentage of respondents who failed to mention a party to the question \Which party would you
vote for if elections were held today?" Circles, cubes, triangles, and diamonds indicate elections for National
and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively.
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Figure 2: Output of activation functions
Note: Values taken by activation functions corresponding to National Parliament (upper left), European Parliament
(upper right), Provincial States (lower left), and City-councils (lower right) in ANN (4).
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Figure 3: Output of activation functions
Note: The middle panel shows the values taken by the activation functions F
u;j
in ANN (4). Solid, short
dashed, long dashed, and dotted lines indicate hidden units corresponding to time until next elections for
National and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively. The lower panel
shows the values taken by the activation function F
a;NP
, corresponding to the time after elections for
National Parliament.
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Figure 4: Output of activation functions
Note: Values taken by activation functions corresponding to National Parliament (upper left), European Parliament
(upper right), Provincial States (lower left), and City-councils (lower right) in MNN (6).
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Figure 5: Activation functions
Note: The middle panel shows the values taken by the activation functions F
j
in MNN (6). Solid, short
dashed, long dashed, and dotted lines indicate hidden units corresponding to time until next elections for
National and European Parliaments, Provincial States, and City-councils, respectively. The lower panel
shows the values taken by the activation function F
a;NP
, corresponding to the time after elections for
National Parliament.
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